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A B S T R A C T
In this perspectives piece, an interdisciplinary team of social science researchers considers the implications of
Covid-19 for the politics of sustainable energy transitions. The emergency measures adopted by states, firms, and
individuals in response to this global health crisis have driven a series of political, economic and social changes
with potential to influence sustainable energy transitions. We identify some of the initial impacts of the ‘great
lockdown’ on sustainable and fossil sources of energy, and consider how economic stimulus packages and social
practices in the wake of the pandemic are likely to shape energy demand, the carbon-intensity of the energy
system, and the speed of transitions. Adopting a broad multi-scalar and multi-actor approach to the analysis of
energy system change, we highlight continuities and discontinuities with pre-pandemic trends. Discussion fo-
cuses on four key themes that shape the politics of sustainable energy transitions: (i) the short, medium and long-
term temporalities of energy system change; (ii) practices of investment around clean-tech and divestment from
fossil fuels; (iii) structures and scales of energy governance; and (iv) social practices around mobility, work and
public health. While the effects of the pandemic continue to unfold, some of its sectoral and geographically
differentiated impacts are already emerging. We conclude that the politics of sustainable energy transitions are
now at a critical juncture, in which the form and direction of state support for post-pandemic economic recovery
will be key.
1. Introduction
Covid-19 is, above all, a global health crisis with devastating im-
plications for a great many as people lose their lives and as we live
through an array of direct and indirect effects of lockdown and social
distancing measures. This perspectives piece is written at a time when
the pandemic is still unfolding, but some of its dramatic and varied
impacts on the global economy, energy and financial markets, gov-
ernance, and our ways of living are already evident. Our purpose here is
to explore how the changes wrought by the pandemic might influence
the complex and dynamic politics of sustainable energy transitions. This
question is particularly pertinent now, as governments, companies, and
wider publics consider what the pandemic means, how to respond and,
importantly, the extent to which responses should be ‘green’.
There had been some positive trends in the politics of sustainable
energy transitions, as broadly defined below, in the years running up to
the outbreak of the pandemic. For example, the Paris Agreement in-
stituted nationally determined climate goals; sustainability transitions
were placed on the agendas of many local, national and global gov-
erning bodies; the cost of renewable energy continued to fall rapidly,
making it an increasingly politically and economically viable option;
divestment campaigns were taking off; and there was a surge in public
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buy-into the argument that urgent action was required to address cli-
mate change. The hope was that COP-26, due to take place in Glasgow
in November 2020, would see increased ambition to meet the goals of
the Paris Agreement. Meanwhile, however, global greenhouse gas
(GHG) emissions continued to rise rather than fall, albeit not in 2019
[1], and there remains a considerable emissions gap between the paths
we are on and where we need to be [2].
Early reports of the economic impact of the pandemic, and the
‘Great Lockdown’, are bleak: the global economy is predicted to shrink
by 6% in 2020, with the possibility that 300 million people lose their
jobs [3]. There will, however, be significant variance in impacts with
some sectors and countries harder hit, and some recovering more
quickly than others. Predictions are that the open, service-oriented
economies that dominate the OECD are likely to suffer more for longer
[4], whilst China’s economy is already showing strong signs of re-
covery. Equally, those economies already carrying significant debt and/
or a reliance on fossil fuel exports are also likely to be harder hit.
In April 2020, almost 54% of the global population were subject to
complete or partial lockdowns and, as such, the share of energy use that
was exposed to containment measures reached 50% [5]. Unsurpris-
ingly, therefore, the early implications of Covid-19 were also significant
but varied for emissions, fossil fuel and sustainable energy. Daily global
CO2 emissions fell by 17% in April 2020, compared to April 2019, with
just under half this reduction coming from surface transport as social
practices changed [6,7], and expectations are of an overall 8% drop in
2020 taking emissions to levels of 10 years ago [5]. Lower emissions are
connected, in turn, to energy use: demand for, and prices of, fossil fuels
and electricity fell quite dramatically. The biggest drop was for oil,
which saw a 25% fall in April 2020, with US oil prices falling negative
for a period of time [5]. Renewable demand was, however, less affected
and is expected to rise overall, by 1%, in 2020. As a result, the share of
renewables within the overall energy mix may jump several years
ahead of pre-pandemic expectations [5].
The debate has, however, already started to turn to what kind of
recovery, in sustainability terms, we can expect. There is considerable
concern that, as with the post-2008 recovery, there will be a rapid re-
turn to high levels of emissions and urban air pollution, and severe
inequalities in terms of social outcomes. By May 2020 air pollutant
levels in China had already over-shot their pre-crisis levels [8], whilst it
is evident that a green recovery is not a luxury that all can afford and
short-term survival strategies, that support business-as-usual, are un-
derway in many parts of the world. At the same time, however, many
are arguing forcefully that sizeable global stimulus packages provide an
historic opportunity to drive sustainable energy transitions whilst, at
the same time, delivering positive societal outcomes such as jobs, green
growth and equity [3].
As such, the economic and social impacts of Covid-19 will do much
to shape the politics of sustainable energy transitions over the next few
years. We structure our discussions below around how important trends
emerging in four thematic areas: energy system change; finance and
investment; multi-scalar governance; and social practices, might be
affected by Covid-19. Whist we recognise limitations in reaching con-
clusions at a time of rapid change and uncertainty, indications so far are
that the pandemic overall is likely to be continuous with, and to ac-
celerate, many of these trends. Our emphasis on the politics of transi-
tions tends to foreground the notion that policy decisions taken as we
emerge out of lockdown and into prolonged periods of social distancing
will be vital to the success of sustainable energy transitions.
2. Defining the politics of sustainable energy transitions
It is important, before we proceed, to provide some key definitions.
Sustainable energy transitions are conceived here as complex socio-
technical processes of decarbonisation within energy systems, and in-
volve both bringing in low, or zero, carbon energy and phasing out old,
high carbon energy [9]. Our understanding of sustainable also includes
due consideration for social issues of energy poverty, equity and justice.
In turn, energy systems, old and new, are understood as being made up
not just of supply, but also demand and social infrastructures [10].
Energy systems and practices are, of course, already undergoing sus-
tainable changes, in particular in electricity, whilst there is significant
variety between countries, in terms of pace, scale and technologies
[11], partly related to political approaches to sustainability.
Politics is broadly understood here as consisting of power relations,
formal and informal political processes, and their outcomes. Energy
politics is increasingly multi-scalar in that it involves a growing multi-
plicity of actors at global, national and sub-national scales [10,12], a
theme to which we return below. Sustainable energy transitions and
politics are deeply intertwined: politics can shape the nature of energy
systems, i.e. the degree to which they become sustainable, but politics is
also, in turn, affected by energy systems [12,13]. This observation in-
forms our choice of energy system change as one of our themes. Sus-
tainable energy policy is, in turn, shaped by embedded power relations
and institutions, but exists today because of the successful articulation
of new ideas, particularly about climate change [10,12]. Within our
definition, energy power relations also include institutionalised fi-
nancial practices, and investment choices, that have long facilitated fossil
fuel lock-in in energy systems [11], to which we return in Section 3.2
below.
Lastly, as part of our multi-actor view of the politics of sustainable
energy transitions we consider social practices, and the role of the
public, to be of paramount importance: as voters, particularly within
democracies; as participants in political movements; and as consumers
and, increasingly, generators of energy [6,14]. Indeed, habits, norms
and culture, can be considered both a constituent element of existing
energy systems [10], as well as a key aspect of how systems can change
given the right political conditions [15]. This aspect of the politics of
sustainable energy becomes particularly relevant given that lockdown
led to, more or less temporary, new social practices.
Partly for these reasons, but also because of wider socio-technical
lock-ins [16], sustainable energy transitions have frequently required
conscious efforts by public actors to steer towards a more sustainable
path. The nature of policy responses to the Covid-19 pandemic emerge
as key given that these have the potential to speed up or slow down
sustainable energy transitions [3,17,18]. Or, put more dramatically, to
determine whether or not political pandemic responses prevent the
world from leaping from the Covid-19 frying pan into the climate fire
[17]. Equally it is important to consider whether Covid-19 has the
potential to change the politics of energy and, if so, in what ways. We
approach these questions by identifying continuities and discontinuities
with sustainable energy politics trends, outlined above and below, and
by thinking in terms of whether these trends are accelerating or decel-
erating. This is what we turn to next.
3. The politics of sustainable energy transitions under Covid-19
The below is clearly not intended as an exhaustive discussion of all
possible implications of Covid-19 for the politics of sustainable energy.
The thematic areas that shape the discussion tie in with our under-
standing of the politics of sustainable energy transitions outlined above,
and are further informed by emerging analyses of the effects of the
pandemic and related debates. What this represents is an early attempt
at analysing complex politics at a time of ongoing change and un-
certainty, with some emphasis on the OECD countries.
3.1. Energy system change
Questions of acceleration and deceleration highlight the importance
of time frames, and the analysis below is sensitive to the temporalities
of Covid-19: i.e. in some parts of the world, the short-term, defined as
the period of lockdown, is over; whilst the medium-term can be defined
as the period over which social distancing and recovery take place; and
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the longer term, mid 2020 s to 2030, where the consequences of deci-
sions made now will be most apparent [18]. What’s key in this thematic
area is the impact of the pandemic on the pace and nature of whole
energy system change, an issue that was already the subject of con-
siderable debate [19], on the growth of the low carbon energy system,
and the looming demise of the incumbent fossil-fuel based system [20].
Historical price crashes and demand shocks left indelible marks on
the evolution of the global energy system, and the current crisis is no
different. The counterfactual when considering implications for whole
energy systems is to consider what the structure of the global energy
system might have been in 2030 had there not been a pandemic.
The short-term impact is clear: an unprecedented fall in energy de-
mand, especially for oil, along with a more modest, but still significant,
decline in electricity demand and prices.1 After the March 2020 oil
price war, OPEC + reached an agreement, that was subsequently
supported by the G20, to reduce global oil production, but, as is always
the case with such deals, the final outcome will only be perceptible later
on. The initial impact on natural gas demand was more muted, but
global production of liquefied natural gas was constrained by a lack of
demand and the future is increasingly uncertain [21]. Coal demand in
China was hit early by falls in industrial output and electricity demand,
both have swiftly rebounded in China, but remained constrained else-
where [5]. Natural gas and coal demand are both linked to power
generation, the relative impact there was related to the extent and
duration of the ‘lockdown’, and its varied impact on industrial activity,
and this complicates matters in relation to coal, domestic gas and
electricity demand [22].
Renewable power generation has fared relatively well, particularly
in those markets where capacity is already significant, and it tops the
merit order. At the same time, the pandemic has impacted on the op-
eration of energy installations, such as offshore wind platforms, and
also slowed the construction of new production facilities and infra-
structure. First, because construction activity was hindered by new
safety measures and second because the breakdown in international
trade disrupted supply chains [23]. Indeed, the IEA, forecasts ap-
proximately 13% less growth in 2020 than in 2019, with growth re-
bounding in 2021 which is a discontinuity with pre-pandemic trends,
albeit the growth of renewables as a percent of the overall mix is con-
tinuous with longer-term trends [24].
The pandemic has also exposed the vulnerabilities of relying on
international supply chains for vital healthcare products and appli-
ances, and the energy industry has been affected here too. For renew-
ables and batteries, government-ordained work stoppages and border
and port closures have also led to a disruption of trade in materials,
components and assembled goods [25]. As the reliability of global
supply chains can no longer be taken for granted, governments and
corporations are considering ‘re-shoring’ essential and strategic in-
dustries, which typically includes the energy sector. As such, the pan-
demic might accelerate an ongoing trend of ‘de-globalization’ and the re-
shoring of critical energy industries, especially those in which China has
obtained a pivotal position in the supply chain and production line.
Covid-19 has also underscored the need to closely monitor security of
supply for certain minerals that are essential for the energy transition,
including cobalt, nickel and copper [26].
In the medium term we will need to closely watch recovery pro-
grammes and the degree to which struggling fossil fuel companies are
supported, and whether there are any decarbonisation conditions. And
the struggle is apparent: already, many energy companies have slashed
their investment plans, final investment decisions (FIDs) have been
delayed and the longer-term prospects for new production are threa-
tened, though not everywhere. The IEA estimates that total energy
investment will fall by 20% in 2020 [27]. The LNG industry is in-
structive with FIDs delayed in North America and Mozambique, whilst
prospects in the Eastern Mediterranean now seem bleak, although Qatar
is going ahead with its expansion. As such, whether or not fossil fuel
producing states decide to support their ailing producers is a critical
factor in determining the medium-term oil, gas and coal outcome. The
plight of the shale industry in the US is also instructive: the rig count
has plummeted, production is falling, and bankruptcies are rising. Just
as in 2014–15, the US shale industry will survive, but production will
probably never return to its 2019–20 peak [28]. This will take the shine
off US ‘energy dominance’ with potentially wide-ranging geopolitical
consequences.
Although it is still early days, companies invested in renewable
energy are more optimistic about their future, but it remains to be seen
whether international oil companies (IOCs), such as BP, Shell and Total,
will accelerate their diversification into ‘new energy’ as they grapple
with the loss of fossil fuel revenue. Much also depends on the pace and
scale of demand recovery, but there are those who argue that 2019
might turn out to be the date of global peak fossil fuel demand [29],
and, as such, in hindsight Covid-19 may be viewed as having ac-
celerated the demise of fossil fuels.
The long-term outlook will be shaped by the pace of economic re-
covery and the degree to which the trillions of dollars of government
stimulus support fossil-fuel incumbents and to which they accelerate
clean energy production and demand side management. Equally, re-
duced electricity demand growth may weaken the appetite for new coal
power in emerging economies. The sentiment of the financial sector is
also a critical factor here, and, see below, accelerated fossil fuels di-
vestment seems one likely outcome [17]. The medium-term cuts in
investment in production, discussed above, may result in high oil and
gas prices and volatility in the second half of the decade, although BP
have revised their long-term oil price outlook, and announced a USD
13bn to 17.5bn write-off [30].
However, it is worth remembering that over 80% of states are not
net fossil fuel exporters. The very prospect of future high oil and gas
prices may accelerate the transition away from such fuels; and fossil-
fuel demand destruction would gather pace, which would constrain
prices. Thus, we can conclude that, for most states, investing in the low-
carbon transition is a win–win strategy that both stimulates economic
recovery and reduces the cost of future fossil-fuel imports.
3.2. Finance and investment
An historically intransigent aspect of sustainable energy transitions
has been the financial practices that have heretofore supported fossil
fuel industries, as well as the financial power of many incumbent ac-
tors. Transnational, and national, oil and gas companies have kept up
investments in long-term projects; coal investments, often by Japan and
China, have continued in developing countries thereby underpinning
the expansion of coal fired electricity; whilst state subsidies for fossil
fuels continue to far outstrip support for sustainable energy [31]. Prior
to this crisis, and the implications for fossil fuel companies listed above,
these investment practices were partly responsible for locking-in diffi-
culties associated with phasing out fossil fuels [11].
Over the past few years, however, there have been growing moves
to divest away from fossil fuels by increasingly high profile private and
quasi-state actors in many OECD countries. There is also growing re-
cognition of financial risks associated with continued fossil fuel in-
vestment, as well as re-evaluations of fossil fuel reserves associated with
concerns about stranded assets. Lastly, energy policy has played a
strong role in, directly or indirectly, supporting investment in renew-
ables, energy efficiency, grid improvements, and storage – albeit in-
vestment levels remain too low [32].
Evidence thus far suggests that the implications of Covid-19 may
accelerate some of these more recent trends. The stronger demand and
price performance of green energy compared to fossil fuels through the
1 Electricity prices in Europe had already been falling as a result of increased
renewable capacity so the pandemic impact, again, tends to amplify existing
trends.
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crisis is a core aspect of expected longer-term sustainable energy tran-
sitions [9]. This potential for relatively improved financial returns for
green versus brown energy is further underpinned by recent analysis
showing superior investment returns from renewable versus fossil fuel
shares since the pandemic, and indeed over the past 5 years [32]. We
have already seen, above, that low oil and gas demand and prices have
resulted in falling investment in, especially, US shale but also a range of
other petroleum provinces. There is also, however, and this is more of a
discontinuity with existing trends, potential for a fall in investment
flows into coal plants as economic growth in emerging economies
weakens [20].
It is also important to also think about who is investing at the mo-
ment given that so many national governments, and some international
actors, are currently implementing, and devising, significant rescue and
stimulus packages which might offer an historic chance for sustainable
investment [33]. Indeed, the IEA has already pointed out that 70% of
funds invested in energy come, directly or indirectly, from the state
[33], and that governments, globally, are planning to spend USD 9tn in
the next months on recovery packages [3]. Thurs far, short-term gov-
ernment spend has been focused on reacting to the health challenge and
protecting livelihoods, jobs and businesses and, as such, tends to sup-
port ‘business-as-usual’ [35]. Indeed, a point of comparison regularly
made is with the recovery process post 2008 which, given limited green
stimulus, returned the world quite quickly to an upward trajectory of
emissions [5,17,36].
There is more hope, however, this time around, of medium and
longer-term stimulus packages leading to green outcomes. Significant
cleantech market progress [37], mainly in efficiency and electricity
sectors, means that ‘business-as-usual’ in energy is now greener than in
2008 for a lot of countries. What can be inferred from this is that, for
those countries that have strong and/or growing cleantech sectors, fo-
cusing investments on green energy may well mean effective short- and
medium-term stimulus. Hepburn et al [17], argue that green invest-
ments, for example in energy efficiency building retrofits, renewables,
and clean energy infrastructure, can be delivered quickly and have high
economic and jobs multipliers, see also [38,39]. Indeed, relative fossil
fuel and sustainable energy share performances and the longer-term
demand outlook for oil and coal provides more evidence to support the
argument that sustainable initiatives offer superior economic returns for
government spending [17], as well as contributing towards longer term
resilience and national emissions targets.
Although the evidence base for green stimulus is much stronger this
time around, it is not yet clear whether, or to which extent, policy-
makers in OECD countries will choose that path. What is clear is the
emergence of high-profile, and widely disseminated, arguments that
state actions in this time period are crucial to a recovery that supports,
and perhaps even accelerates, sustainable energy transitions [3,17,40].
It is also worth noting that there will be significant variety in whether
countries pursue green stimulus, partly in relation their existing com-
mitments to sustainable energy, and how financially embedded clean
and fossil fuel energy sectors are.
3.3. Multi-scalar policy and politics
Sustainable energy transitions have played out against an historical
backdrop of globalisation – in the sense of increasing interdependence
of energy systems, global supply chains, and energy-associated ex-
ternalities – albeit more recent trends, exacerbated by the pandemic,
have been towards ‘re-shoring’. Yet, there has been a general lack of
coordinated and inclusive global energy governance that spans across
all actors and sectors. The historically dominant global governance
institutions typically consist of either producer or consumer clubs, and
they tend to be preoccupied with energy security (of supply or demand)
rather than with decarbonization per se [41].
The last decade, however, has seen major innovations in inter-
governmental governance, notably the creation of the International
Renewable Energy Agency (IRENA) in 2009, the adoption of UN
Sustainable Development Goals, and the Paris Agreement. The latter, in
particular, now requires most national governments to devise and
regularly update their climate pledges, the so-called Nationally
Determined Contributions (NDCs). While this has prompted countries
like the UK and regions like the EU to adopt or propose net zero
emission targets by the middle of the century, other major players, most
significantly the United States, have backtracked at the national level.
Even within the EU there are divisions: most western EU member states
have embraced the energy transition as a means to green and diversify
their energy supply, and as an industrial opportunity, whilst many
eastern EU members are more reluctant, for example Poland is opting to
secure jobs in coal [54]. In this sense, the world in general and the EU in
particular face a multi-speed energy transition.
The Paris Agreement has, importantly, both underpinned the notion
of sub-national and non-state action and galvanized new actors, in-
cluding cities, civil society groups, investors, transnational movements
and corporations. Overall, one could say that the site of sustainable
energy governance has been gravitating away from multilateral di-
plomacy and across national, transnational and local scales [42]. This
dynamic was explicitly supported by the Paris Agreement which, in
starting from nationally determined pledges, took an explicitly more
bottom-up approach. As things stand, however, policies and regulatory
frameworks in almost every country are insufficient in terms of
reaching the new emissions targets [2].
Such was the state of affairs when Covid-19 struck. The pandemic
will have multiple implications for multi-scalar energy governance. One
immediate consequence is that the COP26 climate summit, which was
planned to take place in November 2020 in Glasgow, has been post-
poned by a year. This raises the possibility that the US is represented at
the COP by a new administration with a more positive climate stance,
depending on the outcome of the upcoming US elections. More broadly,
the response of governments to the Covid-19 crisis thus far seems to
bode ill for the system of multilateral cooperation. Regional and in-
ternational organizations from the EU to the UN have struggled to
muster a coordinated response to the pandemic, the US has announced
its withdrawal from the World Health Organization (WHO), and geo-
political tensions between China and the United States have escalated.
The frailty of the current system of global cooperation might reinforce
the decentralization of energy governance from the multilateral to na-
tional, transnational and local scales marking some continuity with di-
rection of travel in governance. It will also be interesting to see in this
regard whether, for example, Covid-19 exacerbates or diminishes the
aforementioned differences in speed and enthusiasm with which the EU
member states pursue the energy transition and how the European
Commission will cope with that.
Another impact of Covid-19 on the multi-scalar nature of sustain-
able energy governance is that the role of national governments has
been stepped up, markedly in many places, in order to respond to the
pandemic [3,17]. Indeed, the pandemic has led to levels of government
intervention in markets and private life not seen in many decades and,
as such, marks some discontinuity with longer term trends. The effec-
tiveness of government intervention, however, will partly depend on
their economic and institutional capacities [43], which may be stret-
ched thin as a result of the unprecedented responses required so far to
Covid-19. At the same time, there is also evidence of cities around the
world responding quite rapidly, often by changing transport modes and
enabling distancing while travelling [20,40,44], sometimes even as
national governments take a different course. Again, this appears to be
an acceleration of the pre-Covid-19 trend of greater multi-scalarity in
how energy is governed, as the pandemic so far shows signs of re-lo-
calizing and re-calibrating places and spaces of energy governance.
3.4. Social & political practices
Clearly, how different social groups are affected by sustainable
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transitions differs markedly between and within countries. Those em-
ployed within fossil fuel industries may feel very differently from those
living within regions at high risk from rising sea levels – hence recent
calls to adjust for such inequalities when governing for sustainable
energy transitions [11].
Within many OECD countries, however, in the years immediately
preceding Covid-19, public support for action on climate change was at
an all-time high [17,18]. For example, mass transnational movements,
like Extinction Rebellion and the Youth Climate Movement, took a
considerable step up in the late 2010 s, whilst opinion polls showed
increasing levels of concern about climate change as well as support for
solutions, like renewables. Reports, in particular IPCC 1.5 degrees [45],
provided a far clearer picture of the human and social implications of
not mitigating, whilst more publicly visible, physical evidence of cli-
mate change had also been mounting. All of which led to a consensus in
many OECD countries that the 2020 s are vital for action to mitigate.
At the time of writing, June 2020, much of society is understandably
focused on human security, improved health, protection of jobs and
incomes, and economic recovery. Those working in high carbon and
clean energy industries will seek support as part of recovery packages.
Arguably, however, pre-Covid-19 surges in support for climate action as
well as how attitudes evolve during the pandemic will be important
considerations for policymakers as they make decisions about what
priority they give to green stimulus, and to developing much needed
new sustainable policies over the medium term.
This, in turn, raises the relevance of debates in the public sphere,
across newspapers, social media and civil society, on what a post-Covid-
19 world will look like – i.e. the ‘new normal’. One of the key outcomes
of lock-down and ongoing social distancing has been considerable, al-
beit partly non-voluntary, changes in social practices – including in
mobility and work practices [7]. Transport has been one of the hardest
hit sectors, especially air, rail, car and bus travel, as people have stayed
home. By contrast, in many countries walking and cycling has proven
the obvious travel replacement for shorter journeys [7,46]. As we have
seen, these practice changes have had clear implications for oil demand,
whilst reduced high carbon travel has been a major contributor to
Covid-19 related emissions reductions. The key question here is whe-
ther social practice changes persist firstly beyond lock-down, and then
through social distancing phases – i.e. staying with the example of
transport, will demand for transport overall be lower longer term, and
how will transport choices differ?
There are various clues that we can consider in relation to this
question. Firstly, in terms of preferred modes of transport, some na-
tional and many local governments, as mentioned above, have an-
nounced new policies aimed at structurally reinforcing moves towards
cycling and walking within cities. Conversely, with relevance for longer
journeys, social distancing lowers demand for public transport, which
may mean a switch to more car journeys for those that have that choice.
At the same time, however, although car sales have fallen dramatically,
and car companies are amongst those clamouring for government
support, electric vehicle sales are still up globally [47].
Secondly, lockdown has provided new evidence about the effec-
tiveness of working from home, not least due to the time saved from not
having to commute [3,7]. Because social distancing also affects people’s
willingness to return to work, and some workplaces may not have
sufficient space, the duration of social distancing is a key variable in
determining longer term travel demand. This is also because, as some
sociologists have noted [7], the longer the time period over which
people are compelled to change practices the more likely some beha-
vioural changes become new norms or habits. In sum, in terms of the
carbon content of travel, Covid-19 appears so far to be continuous with
and accelerated existing trends, like cycling and working from home, but
may present some difficulties in the medium-term for policies en-
couraging public transport as an alternative to cars.
Lastly, when thinking about public responses to the pandemic, there
is evidence emerging that Covid-19 has demonstrated, in more vivid
terms, links between human activity, biodiversity loss, environmental
degradation and health [48]. Air pollution was already climbing up
political agendas in many parts of the world and the WHO estimates
that annually 4.2 million deaths result from exposure to outdoor air
pollution [49]. Now it has also become a key focus within the pan-
demic. Various studies linking Covid-19 deaths with air pollution have
been widely circulated, including comments from the WHO that if you
are exposed to air pollution your chances of being severely affected are
much higher [50,51].
At the same time, it has not gone unnoticed that air pollution has
dropped significantly and, in the case of China, started to rise again as
lockdown eases. Indeed, a recent IPSOS Mori poll, undertaken in
Europe, shows not only that people have noticed the clean air, but that
they are now asking policymakers to refocus on wellbeing over other
indicators such as GDP [7]. Indeed, Covid-19, like climate change, was
no ‘black swan’ event – there have been several warnings of a pandemic
of this nature [52,53]. What Covid-19 has more widely demonstrated,
therefore, is the devastating consequences of ignoring such warnings,
thereby offering some potential to argue for an accelerated shift in po-
litical focus onto long-term measures of broad resilience, and away
from short-term gains.
4. Conclusions
It is clear that the pandemic occurred at a critical juncture in terms
of the relationship between politics and sustainable energy transitions.
State support and policy intervention have been key to promoting ef-
ficiency and accelerating decarbonisation of the energy system, parti-
cularly in a just manner, and now the need for the state to invest to
support post-pandemic economic recovery presents an opportunity to
energise green growth.
Many of the main drivers of what happens next represent a con-
tinuation of processes that pre-date the pandemic. A key question that
has emerged here is whether or not there will be an acceleration of
trends towards a more sustainable future, or whether the desire to
protect existing jobs and incumbent industry will retard the momentum
that was emerging in some countries under the banner of a ‘green new
deal’ or ‘green growth’. One lesson from the 2008 crisis was that, when
it comes to emissions, a rebound to the ways of old is as likely as not.
However, this perspectives piece has found some reasons to think that
this time might be somewhat different.
Given relative economic performances between fossil fuels and
sustainable energy during the pandemic, there appears to be a greater
chance of green stimulus this time around. Much also depends on
whether changes imposed in the lockdown result in longer term beha-
vioural and structural change in relation to issues like fossil fuel de-
mand, air quality, and support for climate change mitigation. New
global accords now exist, in the form of the Paris Agreement and the
UN’s 2030 Agenda and associated SDGs, that provide targets and di-
rection for politicians and policy makers to strive towards and, im-
portantly, against which increasingly active publics can hold them to
account. Furthermore, the Covid-19 crisis has explicitly exposed a lack
of political response to warnings of human disaster and of resilience in
public health and welfare, which provides further support for argu-
ments that a post-pandemic world should not be politics, or indeed
business, as usual.
Rising diversity and inequality, both within and between countries,
were also a hallmark of recovery from the global financial crisis, but
these issues may well become even more significant as some parts of the
world, Europe, some US states and cities, focus more on sustainable
change, whilst others cannot afford, or will not be politically in-
centivised, to do so. Clearly, it will be critical to see what happens in the
major economies but as over 90% of future demand growth between
now and 2050 lies outside the OECD, the road to recovery in the
emerging economies of Asia, Latin America and sub-Saharan Africa is
just as significant.
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The oil price crash that accompanied the pandemic has made clear
the need for so the so-called ‘Producer Economies’ to finally put
themselves on a more sustainable path, particularly if a green recovery
results in an earlier peak in fossil fuel demand and an acceleration of
permanent demand destruction. Failure of fossil fuel-dominated
economies to adapt to such a trajectory will likely result in instability
and conflict, both within and between states. In this context, there is an
urgent need to explore further what these geographical diversities mean
for the future politics of sustainable energy transitions, whilst not for-
getting the growing significance of scale and diversity in political re-
sponses within countries.
Last, but far from least, there is the matter of publics and political
participation. Some argue that publics will now be focused on jobs/
recovery only, but there are some early indications that this is an over-
simplification. Thus, it will be important that those policymakers tasked
with ensuring sustainable transitions appeal to new behaviours, values,
and evidence as they design recovery packages, alongside reviving
some aspects of business-as-usual in the economy. It is in this wider
societal context that academics can play a critical role in helping to
understand possible futures, making clear that what is done today can
shape those futures in a positive way. Rather like the archivist in the
film, ‘The Age of Stupid’,2 who in 2055 reflects back on why society
failed to take the actions necessary to avoid catastrophic climate
change, we do not want to look back on 2020–21 as a time when we
were unable to turn a global health crisis into an opportunity to finally
put the world on a more sustainable path, both in terms of human se-
curity and environmental sustainability.
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